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7.1 (left) The first representation of a shape destined to become one of 
the most complex images shared by humankind. Sketched by Manhattan 
scienti~t Luis ~varez minutes aft~r the first Atomic bomb explosion, 
the artist subIDltted to the perspective of the bomb itself and converted 
history into mere data. (US National Archives.) 
7.2 (right) ' ... all representations of the atomic bombings face the 
specter of impossibility.' The mushroom cloud from plutonium bomb 'Fat 
Man' rises above Nagasaki after detonating at 11.02 a.m., August 9, 1945. 
(US National Archives.) 
The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is 
a mysterious film in every way.l For decades it was known as the 
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maboroshi atomic bomb film in Japan. Maboroshi loosely trans-
lates 'phantom' and is used for objects whose existence is known 
but whose location remains a mystery. Their shadowy presence 
tugs on the mind. In fact, this film came close - on many occaSIOns 
- to a very real non-existence. Its production stopped and 
resumed by the American military, subsumed and redirected by 
both Japanese and American governments, confiscated on several 
occasions, suppressed and lost for decades, censored by the 
Japanese government, and defiantly repatriated by common 
Japanese citizens, The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki has a complex history closely intertwined with the 
postwar experience of Japan. Simply described, it is a 2 hour 45 
minute science documentary about the aftermath of the atomic 
bombings from a scientific perspective. Shot in 1945 and finished 
in the first months of 1946, it represents the first full-fledged 
documentary on the atomic bomb attacks. However, its meaning 
expands far beyond this. Since surfacing from its maboroshi exist-
ence, it has been picked apart and appropriated by countless 
feature films, documentaries, books, magazines, and television 
reports. Its images have even been converted into other media, 
such as still photography, animation, and the special effects of 
feature films. These appropriations have turned The Effects of the 
Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki into the source for 
many of humanity's images and icons for the atomic bomb 
attacks. Had the suppression of this film been successful, every 
single film about the bombings would be different. More impor-
tantly, our very memory of the events would be radically altered. 
In this sense, we can say The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the starting point for hibakusha 
cinema ... ironic for a film often described as 'an accumulation 
of scientific facts [that] eliminates the human factor altogether.'2 
This writer refers to the cold, scientific tone from which the 
documentary never wavers, an astoundingly insensitive treatment 
of its subject matter which has made an already complicated 
history even more confusing. There are both claims and accu-
sations regarding its authorship. Upset viewers and historians 
want to give credit for the film's inhuman, scientific approach to 
the victorious Americans of the occupation. Photographers (and 
their biographers) want to take credit for recording its epochal 
images while emphasizing their distance from postproduction.3 
The filmmakers closest to positions of power and responsibility 
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reveal a much more nuanced perspective. All these versions clash 
at different points, creating gaps and fissures that make the messi-
ness of history emerge in force. In the end, we are left with the 
troubling reality of two atomic bombs and an overwhelmingly 
contradictory discourse from which to look back and survey the 
chaos, a precarious tripod to be sure. Before examining the film 
and its recontextualizations, we would do well to carefully piece 
the story together as best we can, for each twist and tum in the 
course of production deeply affected the very shape of the film 
and how it has been interpreted. 
Part of this history's messiness derives from the sheer difficulty 
of writing about the bomb; all representations of the atomic 
bombings face the specter of impossibility. This problematic 
appears insurmountable for those of us so far removed from the 
experience of the attack. If there is anything striking about 
the historical record of the atomic bomb film, it is the reticence 
of historians to write, their reliance on the memories of those 
with first hand experience. Facing the failure of their tools of 
representation they - we - tum to those with direct experience, 
those whose relationship to the attacks is not already mediated 
by others in the first place, whether it be through written texts, 
sounds, images, or even the shadow of a human being etched in 
stone. There is a desire to let those with direct experience speak. 
This decision to defer to the apparent authority of these texts 
also exposes a need to commit the personal experience to public 
memory. This is invariably history-in-the-first-person, for there is 
something about the epicenter - what is there - that inevitably 
converts narration into testimony. When historians have repro-
cessed these contentious testimonies into narrative, they have had 
to smooth out the contradictions, leading to quiet distortion for 
the sake of a sense of completeness. By way of contrast, a textual 
patchwork of these first-person histories will preserve some 
degree of the complexity of the film's tangled production history, 
and more importantly, make palpable the multiple points of view 
bearing down on these 19 reels of sound and image. 
The day after a single plane attacked Nagasaki, discussions for a 
documentary began at Nippon Eigasha (Nichiei), the primary 
producer of nonfiction films during WWII and one of the few 
production companies remaining at the end of the war. Ito Sueo 
(director): 'On August 10, 1945, I was in the Culture Film Unit 
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of Nippon Eigasha in Tokyo's Ginza. Shimomura Masao and Uriu 
Tada04 from the our News Unit came to see me. We talked about 
the damage from the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima on 
August 6th and Nagasaki on August 9th, news of which had been 
coming in from the Domei Tsushinsha desk. They said that this 
disastrous scene ought to be recorded; simply put, they suggested 
we appeal to the world by communicating the inhuman facts 
through the International Red Cross in Geneva. I agreed, and 
finally spoke with producer Kano Ryuichi, director of the Culture 
FIlm Unit Tanaka, and Production Chief Iwasaki. They agreed. 
However, five days later on August 15th, the surrender of Japan 
was announced and the possibility of appealing to the world 
through the International Red Cross disappeared.'s 
With the end of the war, government production capital dried 
up and whatever funds remained were devoted to survival. 
Despite the uncertain future of their company, the intention of 
making a documentary to reveal the destruction of the bomb to 
the world remained strong at Nichiei. Discussions continued, 
and the head of planning, Aihara Hideji, kept a proposal in a 
furoshiki wherever he went. At the beginning of September, 
Toho's Mori Iwao and Yamanashi Minoru from Eigahaikyusha 
met the president of Nichiei, Negishi Kan'ichi, and asked why 
Nichiei wasn't making an atomic bomb documentary. Negishi 
called in Aihara and explained the plans they had already 
developed, as well as their money problem. Through the quick 
efforts of Toho and Eigahaikyusha, they arranged for somewhat 
informal financing. With a budget in place Iwasaki Akira (head 
of production) and Kano Ryuichi (producer) worked feverishly 
on preproduction while director Ito set out for Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki to pave the way for the arrival of the film crew. 
Ito: 'On September 7, 1945, I put three days' worth of rice in 
a rucksack and departed Tokyo alone. I had been informed about 
the harmfulness of radioactivity, so I flinched when I got off at 
Hiroshima Station in the middle of a field whose entire surface 
was burned. First, it took a day to push the prefectural and city 
offices. I talked with them about food and the construction of 
housing for the film crews to follow, but they had their hands full 
with relief for surviving citizens and took no notice of me. I was 
consuming the rice I had brought and feared I would simply 
starve, so I put off Hiroshima until later ... and went to my home 
in Nagasaki prefecture .... I contacted Nichiei's home office in 
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7.3 Nichiei filmmakers on location. (McGovern Collection.) 
Tokyo. As a result, I discovered from the Tokyo home office that 
the plans for the shooting of the atomic bomb film had taken a 
big change of course. Nippon Eigasha's independent photography 
would stop, and acting together with the Special Committee to 
Study the Damage of the Atomic Bomb formed by the Ministry 
of Education (Monbusho), we would shoot the contents of their 
investigation .... Shooting would begin in Hiroshima, and after 
finishing there move to Nagasaki. Because lost time was precious, 
I insisted on beginning to shoot in Nagasaki. The home office 
decided it was all right to begin photography with cameraman 
Kurita Kurotada from the Fukushima branch, but later assistance 
director Mizuno Hajime and assistant cameraman Sekiguchi 
Toshio would be sent from Tokyo.'6 
The fate of the film had taken a decisive change of course back 
in Tokyo; Kano Ryuichi (producer): 'At the time we worked out 
our action plan for photography, Monbusho's Gakujutsu Kenkyu-
kaigi also established the Special Committee to Study the 
Damage of the Atomic Bomb (September 14). It was decided 
that the various groups would begin their investigatory activities. 
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We (5 units, with a 33 person film crew) were to act together with 
the committee's scientists, and we also received the cooperation of 
many of the scholars in the photography. That is to say, the 
film unit often took the management of transportation and the 
construction of lodging. Then during shooting we contacted each 
other to find objects for data collection that seemed like potential 
scientific material. We went in the same three trucks and cars 
from the lodging to the epicenter every day ... the reason that I 
write this is that it is important to make clear what it was like in 
those days. Some say Monbusho had us make the film; others say 
we were directed by the research teams .... Of course, Nichiei 
bore the cost of production. Moreover, the film stock was pro-
vided by Nichiei. As for the fact of American provisions, outside 
of some special photography, there was none at all.'7 
On September 15, the Nichiei film crews headed for Hiroshima, 
accompanying the scientists of the Monbusho investigation team. 
They began their shoot despite rumors about radiation effects, 
and the photography proceeded smoothly. Most fears were in 
people's minds; Aihara: 'I couldn't shoot more than half of what 
I wanted to. There was always this struggle over whether I should 
shoot this or not. That was my own problem, my impression at 
7.4 Atomic shadows of handrails and humans on Bandai Bridge. 
(McGovern Collection.) 
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that time. Inside, there was the problem of exposing military 
secrets, an awful feeling as if I were benefiting the enemy.'8 
However, other members of the production team were 
absorbed in other thoughts as they hauled heavy equipment 
across the remains of Hiroshima; Kikuchi Shu (second camera 
assistant for cinematographer Miki Shigeru): 'We started from 
the epicenter.... Here and there across the city were corpses. 
Wooden homes were completely crushed and burned. The only 
shapes remaining were buildings reinforced with steel and iron 
frames. . .. Miki would walk quickly - sutakora sutakora - to 
some far off place until his body would become small. He'd boom 
out "Hey, over here, over here," and we followed along as best 
we could.... We were shocked by the shadow of a handrail 
burned onto Bandai Bridge, as well as the clearly carved shadow 
of human beings walking on the bridge. This had to be a charac-
teristic of the atomic bomb. One day, I think we were shooting 
at Hiroshima Castle, and we came upon the "corpse of a horse," 
and remembered Fighting Soldiers.9 All over the place there were 
what seemed to be shadows of human bodies; it left quite an 
impression .... About 20 days passed. Kaneko Hoji and I packed 
up the exposed film and took it back to Nichiei's home office in 
Tokyo. Miki took the Palbo Camera, large format still camera, 
and tripod, and set out for Nagasaki.'lo 
Back in Tokyo, Iwasaki and Kano watched the rushes as they 
came in from Hiroshima; Iwasaki recalls, 'Every frame burned 
into my brain.'ll While the teams of scientists and cinematogra-
phers worked in Hiroshima, Ito had been on his own in Nagasaki. 
Ito: 'Shooting started on September 16. We were most concerned 
with the effects (eikyo) on human bodies. Because more than a 
month had already passed since the bombing, the corpses had all 
been dealt with. Most victims were staying in the hospitals of 
nearby cities, towns and villages. ... We got to know some victims 
while shooting, and days later when we called on them, they were 
already gone. Corpses were carried down to basement rooms. It 
was a terrible scene we'd want to look away from .... I diligently 
walked and shot what was left among the burned fields. With the 
coming of October, people from the units that had finished shoot-
ing in Hiroshima gradually came to Nagasaki. I was put in the 
physical structures unit, but didn't participate and continued to 
photograph according to my own plan.'12 
Along with the scientists and film crews, the military occupation 
126 
The Body at the Center 
also arrived in Nagasaki. The investigations, data collection, and 
its photography proceeded smoothly until October 24, when Seki-
guchi Toshio, Ito's assistant cameraman, found himself at the 
center of an incident that once again radically changed the course 
of the film. Sekiguchi: 'It was around here ... there were plants 
coming up in the burned area. This was unusual so I was taking 
a closeup with my Eyemo. While I was shooting an MP came up. 
He asked, "What are you doing?" and things like that. I told him 
I was shooting the burned areas. "By whose order?" he asked. I 
told him I was with staff from Nippon Eigasha which was shooting 
a documentary film on the atomic bombing with Dr. Nishina. 
Taking me away, he had quite a look on his face. I was led over 
there to talk with someone, I don't remember the name, but they 
had translators and it was quite friendly. Then I was brought back 
to the previous place. They confiscated film, too. I had been 
shooting still photos with a Leica. They asked, "What's this?" I 
replied, "I've been shooting the burned area." They told me to 
take out all the film.'l3 
Ito had been off searching for locations during this time, and 
didn't hear Sekiguchi's story until later; Ito: 'That night communi-
cation from the Nichiei home office in Tokyo came in to the 
Domei Tsushinsha Nagasaki Branch Office: Photography was sus-
pended by order of the occupation forces. On October 27, a 
command came from the Nagasaki Communications Office of the 
American military for a shooting supervisor to report to their 
office in Katsuyama public school. I went with Aihara, the plan-
ning supervisor for the physical sections. In the principal's office, 
which was being used as the commander's office, where a pistol 
was laying on the desk, we had a long conversation through a 
Japanese American translator. In conclusion, filming was can-
celed. All personnel were evacuated. It was decided that everyone 
would return to Tokyo.'14 
By the time shooting was interrupted, Nichiei filmmakers had 
exposed 26,000 feet of film about all aspects of the bombing. The 
photography was nearly complete, but they were on the verge of 
losing everything. In the course of shooting, the Surgeon Gen-
eral's Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of 
the Atomic Bomb bumped into one of the crews in a Hiroshima 
hospital and became aware of the film. And they wanted it. One 
of the doctors of this group, Averill Liebow, had a keen interest 
in the footage. In his published diary - a rather odd account of 
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the effects of the bomb from the point of view of a pathologist 
- the doctor records a deceptively disinterested account of his 
relationship to the film; Uebow: 'I was also informed that a 
documentary film had been prepared at Hiroshima by the Nippon 
Eigasha in late 1945, but this had not been completely developed. 
Mer much discussion with Messrs. Kobayama [AMN - Okuy-
ama?] and Aibara of that company, the film was developed and 
on December 19 it was viewed in the Surgeon General's Office. 
As expectedJt was a remarkable record. Its possible use for 
propaganda purposes was not difficult to visualize .... A copy was 
retained and sent to the United States for use by the American 
componant of the Joint Commission.'J.5 
In fact, the situation was somewhat less benign. Aihara dis-
trusted Uebow's intense interest, and ignored the doctor's many 
messages.16 At the same time that Iwasaki Akira negotiated with 
the headquarters of the occupation, Liebow pursued the film 
through official channels with memos to GHQ asking for the 
film's confiscation on the behalf of the Surgeon General; Liebow: 
'1. Request that motion picture films concerning Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in the possession of Nippon Eigasha be procured for 
the Atomic Bomb Commission of this office. . . 3. These films, 
which were made beginning late in August 1945, are said to 
contain much documentary medical material of great importance 
to the Atomic Bomb Commission.'17 Though one would not know 
it from his diaries, Uebow's efforts resulted in the first confis-
cation of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. On December 18, GHQ confiscated the film as per 
Uebow's request and sent it to the Surgeon General's Office. 
During the course of these negotiations, the Strategic Bombing 
Survey (USSBS) arrived on Japanese soil to investigate the results 
of Allied bombing raids on the home islands, including the attacks 
on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Among the USSBS staff was Daniel 
McGovern, an Army-Air Force cinematographer who had shot 
William Wyler's Memphis Belle. He was to make a visual record 
for the Survey. While in Nagasaki, a lingering Nichiei employee 
approached McGovern and explained their troubles with GHQ. 
Reasoning it was a waste to duplicate Nichiei's work, the USSBS 
joined negotiations for the film. 
At this point, the historical record turns from the memoirs of 
the filmmakers to internal memoranda passing between offices 
of the American military. In a flurry of screenings and memos, 
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the fate of the film was decided (for the time being). Both the 
Surgeon General's Office and the Strategic Bombing Survey were 
asking for control over the unedited film. The Surgeon General's 
Office asked that 'the entire negative' be forwarded to their 
Washington office 'in view of the fact that medical aspects are of 
foremost importance,' a suspicious claim considering the fact that 
the medical portion amounted to a mere 6,000 feet and that they 
already had a positive copy of this footage.18 At the same time, 
the USSBS offered an argument that Iwasaki had been making 
ever since shooting had been halted; McGovern: 'In its present 
form this heterogeneous mass of photographic material is practi-
cally valueless, despite the fact that the conditions under which 
it was taken will not be duplicated, until another atomic bomb is 
released under combat conditions. Several weeks will be required 
properly to edit, cut, caption this material in such a manner that 
it will have a scientific value as atomic bomb research material. 
The only individuals qualified to do this work are the cameramen 
who exposed the film, the individuals who were members of the 
Japanese research party, and able translators working in conjunc-
tion with the Nippon Newsreel CO.'19 
7.5 Daniel McGovem in Nagasaki, with Urakami Cathedral in the 
background. (McGovern Collection.) 
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On January 2, 1946, representatives from NAVfECHJAP, G-
2, USSBS, and the Surgeon General's Office met and decided 
that NAVfECHJAP would help Nichiei complete location pho-
tography, while the Strategic Bombing Survey would supervise 
Nichiei's postproduction. The Surgeon General would receive a 
new work print of the 8,000 feet of medical film they already 
possessed. This meeting was actually the most crucial juncture in 
the history of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The decision to allow Nichiei to finish their film for 
the USSBS meant the Surgeon General's Office would lose its 
claim and receive only unedited rushes. This footage is now 
maboroshi; had the decision weighed in the favor of the American 
doctors, it is likely Nichiei's moving images of the atomic bom-
bings would have been lost forever. 
After this narrow miss, GHQ officially directed the USSBS to 
manage and fund Nichiei's postproduction under the supervision 
of McGovern and Dan Dyer. Ironically, Dyer had been Chief 
Target Analyst for Major General LeMay's superfortress squad-
rons, and had been in charge of target selection at the end of the 
war. Presumably this included Hiroshima and Nagasaki. GHQ 
also ordered the 'confiscation' and shipping of all materials to 
the Pentagon.20 On January 11, a memo to Iwasaki officially 
directed Nichiei to finish their film, asking for a complete budget 
for 'services rendered,' including all materials, expenses, labor 
and still photography. The memo also contained the following 
provision: 'All caption material and research matter will be 
included and also all short ends and excess negative will be put 
in containers and marked with a number. .. All phases of the 
picture, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the medical section will be 
completed and ready for turning over to the USSBS Motion 
Picture Project on or before 1 March 1946 .... No other organiz-
ation will be permitted to confiscate or remove the material from 
the Nippon Newsreel Company.'21 
This memo came as quite a shock to the Japanese filmmakers, 
and has achieved considerable notoriety in the history of Japanese 
cinema.22 In fact, multiple versions of the incident have circulated 
over the past 50 years. Many writers, Nichiei filmmakers and 
historians alike, describe a scenario months later near the end of 
postproduction, in which Nichiei is suddenly informed that every 
scrap of evidence of the film is to be turned over. Some histories 
describe the signing of an oath of silence. Nearly all of them 
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suggest an atmosphere of oppression. This memo to Iwasaki at 
the beginning of postproduction suggests these stories are some-
what inflated. 23 
Be that as it may, the word 'confiscation'l'bosshu' meant some-
thing quite different to each side. In the world of the American 
military men, it was hardly unusual vocabulary; it meant picking 
up services rendered from Nichiei.24 From the perspective of the 
Japanese filmmakers, this 'bosshu' was akin to theft. After all, 
the bulk of the film had been shot and developed with Japanese 
money before the Americans arrived on the scene. They reasoned 
they at least deserved a copy, and naturally feared their film 
would never see the light of a projector once in the possession 
of the American military. As Ito recalled, 'When the confiscation 
order was issued, I thought this inevitably meant that the material 
would never be returned.'25 
While the Nichiei filmmakers edited the footage and recorded 
an English-language soundtrack, the staff kept asking the pro-
ducers if there was nothing they could do to prevent the confis-
cation. Kano: 'Don't you have to agree without resistance that 
all the film of the atomic bomb film will be taken away without 
a trace? ... Anyway, quickly, we made arrangements to secretly 
preserve one rush print. In order to proceed with complete sec-
recy it was crucial that this be accomplished through few hands. 
We thought about that. When film production nears the com-
pletion stage, it is complicated and rushed. Around this time, 
errors can be made. That's it. With a voucher request to the 
laboratory, a duplicate could be made by mistake. Iwasaki, Kano, 
Ito, and Matsuda from the production desk: only these four 
people knew this mistake.'26 
Ito: 'This print was placed in the lab operated by Miki Shigeru, 
who had retired from Nichiei. We never made the situation clear 
to him. Those days, people going against orders of the occupation 
forces were assigned to hard labor in Guam or Okinawa as 
punishment. The four of us agreed to be ready for 10 years of 
hard labor in the case of being discovered.'27 
This quiet, courageous act of defiance assured that moving 
images of the atomic bombings would be preserved for future 
generations, no matter what happened to the materials they were 
about to hand over to the American military. It has been called 
'the moral equivalent to vengeance,'2B and the filmmakers have 
even been compared to the 47 ronin of Chushingura.29 This 
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incomplete, silent print remained in Miki Shigeru's ceiling until 
the end of the Occupation; rumours about it circulated in the 
Japanese film world, but the filmmakers were never arrested and 
sent to Okinawa. 
They were, however, caught. McGovern knew they had kept a 
print for themselves, but looked the other way.3O He was happy 
with their finished film, felt it was the Japanese filmmaker's work, 
and thought it only appropriate that a copy remain in Japan. 
Furthermore, while the greatest fears of the Japanese filmmakers 
were correct - the film was destined to become maboroshi in the 
hands of the United States government - they misunderstood 
the intentions of the USSBS. The 'confiscation' did not mean 
'suppression' ... yet. 
McGovern was convinced that Americans should see the 
destruction caused by their atomic bombs. He liked the Nichiei 
film and had grand plans for its wide release in America. To pave 
the way, he arranged for a Tokyo screening, paying the expenses 
out of his own pocket. He invited foreign correspondents to 
create advance publicity back home. Mark Gayn, the Chicago-
Sun Times correspondent and author of Japan Diary, filed a story 
with detailed descriptions of the film, including the budget.31 
Meanwhile, Nichiei reluctantly packed seven wooden boxes with 
the photographs, film, and negative, and delivered it to the 
Americans. 
Back in the States, McGovern started distribution negotiations 
with Warner Brothers and began arrangements for official per-
mission. A screening was held at the US. Navy Science Lab in 
Anacosta, Maryland. Pentagon officers, public relations special-
ists, and representatives from the Manhattan Project attended. 
At the end of the screening, the Manhattan Project people raised 
objections to the public release of the film on the grounds that 
it contained the height at which the bomb had been detonated. 
The diligent filmmakers and scientists had triangulated atomic 
shadows to make their calculation and had come within 50 feet 
of the correct altitude. As a result, the film was classified 
SECRET RD.32 Today it is difficult to believe this suppression 
was not motivated by the same fears expressed by Dr. Liebow. 
In the 'wrong' hands, this footage could be used to ends the US. 
government would not approve of. However, this would not 
explain why a few of the most violent images were subsequently 
released to Paramount News to accompany images of the 
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explosions on Bikini. In any case, the film,negative and photo-
graphs were confiscated one more time, only this time it seemed 
to be for keeps. The fate of this material remained unknown, 
maboroshi, until 1994.33 
This was precisely what McGovem feared. Like his Japanese 
colleagues, he undermined the power structures putting pressure 
on the film. In an act of resistance as brave as that of the Nichiei 
filmmakers, he struck a 16mm composite print of the film, took 
it to the USAF Central Film Depository at Wright Air Force 
Base, and quietly deposited the print. Had he obeyed his orders, 
we might have been left with only the silent, incomplete reels 
hidden in Tokyo. Both acts of resistance are of equal gravity. 
However, the consequences are far different. For while the Nich-
iei print has been continually suppressed one way or another,34 
the McGovern print ended up as public domain material 
deposited in the US. National Archives, one of the most access-
ible film archives in the world.35 
The film left in the wake of this bewildering, serpentine story 
- The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - is 
a 2 hour, 45 minute epic that minutely investigates the destruction 
wrought by the two atomic attacks. Although it was initially 
conceived of as an appeal to the world to recognize the horror 
of the bombs and the tragedy of their victims, the final film seems 
to appeal to no one in particular. It is only a cold, hard examin-
ation of the effects of the bomb from a ruthlessly scientific point 
of view. The bulk of the film is devoted to buildings and plant 
life. The images of human beings have been disparagingly, and 
quite appropriately, compared to police mug shots. 36 Thus, in 
the end it would seem the American supervision overpowered the 
intentions of the Japanese filmmakers. This has been the assump-
tion of everyone who has seen the film, however, a closer reading 
will find markers that throw this conclusion into doubt. Indeed, 
the Americans entered the production near the completion of 
location photography, and few historians have considered the 
plans under which the shooting actually took place. Determining 
the responsibility for this 'inhuman approach' is far from simple. 
The complexity underlying the assumptions of 'authorship' are 
condensed in the issue of the film's title and its translation into 
Japanese. Issues of power always circulate around the practice of 
translation between languages and their cultures. Because trans-
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lation is the medium through which all communication with the 
other must pass, close examination of a given translation act will 
reveal much about the larger dynamics at work. The Effects of 
the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was rendered into 
Japanese as Hiroshima, Nagasaki ni okeru genshibakudan no 
koka. This appears to be a simple, direct translation, however, its 
last word has proven extremely controversial. Kokal'effect' also 
means 'results.' It strongly implies the people in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were used as guinea pigs in a cruel experiment. The 
author of this translation is unknown; however, Japanese have 
automatically attributed it to the victor of the war. They have 
taken the title to be powerfully emblematic of the callous attitude 
expressed in the film. For example, Kogawa Tetsuo argues, 'From 
the beginning [the Americans] openly used the word koka, and 
by using this title they had already decided that they were not 
going to depict human beings as human beings. As the title 
indicates, they are mere research material.'37 Writing in the turbu-
lent 1960s when the film was still maboroshi, Noda Shinkichi 
speculated that the title had to be attached by the Americans. 
His suspicions get the better of him and he makes a telling slip 
at the end of his article: instead of koka, he substitutes 'seika,' 
or 'fruits' (of one's labor)!38 The ugly irony that this mistranslation 
introjects reveals Noda's rage at the Americans. Just as telling is 
the incident when the McGovern print was returned to Monbusho 
in 1967. The ministry changed the title translation from 'koka' to 
'eikyo'l'influence'. While this word can imply effect, it was really 
meant to remove the impression of experimentation and intro-
duce a vague, even metaphysical, feeling to the title. Monbusho 
intentionally designed its misprision to create a misreading of the 
film; nervous about their complicity with the project, they even 
diffused their credit, cut out all the scenes of human suffering, 
and to this day allow no one to see the print except medical 
researchers. On the other hand, Noda's unintentional misprision 
exposes his projection of guilt for crimes against humanity onto 
the Americans. Fmally, in 1994 a citizens' movement organized 
by director Hani Susumu and many others began raising money 
to create a Japanese-language version of the film, which they 
renamed Hiroshima, Nagasaki ni okeru genshi bakudan no saigai, 
or 'disaster.'39 Like Noda, Kogawa, and pretty much every spec-
tator since the end of the war, they need to re-read the film as a 
further victimization of the citizens of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. 
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However, before we accept this attribution of cinematic 
aggression, we must turn back to the issue of translation once 
more. All Japanese commentators have treated the words 'koka' 
and 'effect' as interchangeable, a one-to-one correspondence in 
meaning. Native English speakers will be hesitant to reduce the 
meaning of 'effect of the bomb' to 'result of an experiment.' 
While there is certainly truth to the claim that the bombings 
were to some degree spurious experiments, this is not necessarily 
implied by the 'effect' of the film's title. Furthermore, the 'influ-
ence' of the bomb would seem to refer to the political and social 
ramifications of the attacks. Around the English word 'effect' 
spins a tangled Japanese critical discourse informed by mistrans-
lation and misunderstanding, exposing a dynamic of presumption 
and projection. 
This body of sound and image is shrouded by high-running 
passions and a mass of contradiction, all in tune with the quality 
of Japan-America relations at a given moment in history. 
Examples abound. Noda - a leftist filmmaker and the most sus-
picious of our 'translators' - writes at the height of the Ampo 
Security Treaty protests. At about the same time, Monbusho 
arbitrarily changed the title because of the Japanese government's 
sensitivity toward foreign relations, and probably their own poli-
cies (public and otherwise) concerning nuclear power, nuclear 
arms and the war in Vietnam. In the 1980s, Kudo Miyoko was 
inspired to write her biography of cameraman Harry Mimura out 
of anger when she misunderstood the 1940s English in the film's 
narration; she presumed 'primitive hospitals' implied Japanese 
were considered barbarians, and that 'hospital inmates' meant 
they were nothing but 'prisoners.'40 Tanikawa Yoshio suspected 
ulterior, political motives to explain why only a 16mm print was 
returned to Japan and not the original 35mm negative, and why it 
was returned to the conservative Monbusho rather than Nichiei.41 
Some historians refer to Sekiguchi's questioning - which he 
describes above as 'friendly' - as an arrest. Blame for the insensi-
tive attitude of the film, along with its suppression, is often dis-
placed onto the USSBS supervisors. The 'confiscation' is 
dramatically inflated with MPs and the like.42 Actually, Mimura 
struck lasting friendships with his American colleagues, and both 
Ito and McGovern characterized their relationship as friendly 
and professiona1.43 When asked if the Americans interfered with 
the work of the Nichiei staff at any point, Ito replied, 'Absolutely 
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not. I think it was probably the same for the others. I don't 
remember hearing that kind of story from either Iwasaki or Kano. 
It was shot freely the way we wanted to.'44 
Ironic and unfathomable though it may be, The Effects of the 
Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is, in all its inhumanity, 
a Japanese film. If we can push through all the suspicions and 
analyze the film itself, there are different perspectives from which 
we can learn much about both this particular documentary and 
all hibakusha cinema. 
Once we acknowledge that The Effects of the Atomic Bomb 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was produced according to the plan 
of Japanese filmmakers, the film looks less and less mysterious. 
Affinities between the film and other documentaries of its time 
suddenly appear, and it becomes possible to see the Nichiei effort 
as continuous with long-standing practices of documentary 
filmmaking in Japan. In the late 1930s, a split developed in the 
Japanese documentary world. It formed partly due to the influ-
ence of a 1937 translation of Paul Rotha's Documentary Film, 
and deepened when the government made the screening of docu-
mentaries mandatory as part of the war effort. Lines were drawn 
between filmmakers who valued a directness in documentary, and 
followers of Rotha who took the liberty of 'dramatizing reality.' 
The former valued cinema's ability to transmit actuality faithfully, 
while the latter filmmakers deployed editing, music, sound, and 
photography to build multiple readings and layers of meaning 
into their films. In the immediate postwar era when the Nichiei 
filmmakers were planning their atomic bomb film, we can still 
see these two streams continuing over the breach of the surren-
der. Kamei Fumio was busy reworking wartime newsreels for The 
Tragedy of Japan (Nihon no higeki, (1946), making them say 
things far different from their original design through creative 
montage.45 Filmmakers with inclinations toward the direct method 
were working on the atomic bomb documentary project. Only 
two of these filmmakers had been full-fledged directors before 
the end of the war. Ito was known for films with, in the words 
of Noda, a 'structural hardness.'46 Okuyama Dairokuro learned 
filmmaking with Ota Nikichi, the pioneer of the kagaku eiga, or 
science film. 
The kagaku eiga was the genre deployed in the atomic bomb 
film, and represented the extreme end of the approach that makes 
the direct representation of reality an uncompromising value. 
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Originally patterned after the German kulturfilm, the develop-
ment of the kagaku eiga took a peculiar course in Japan, showing 
a penchant for the accumulation of data without processing it for 
larger meaning. For example, Bakufu to danpen (Bomb Blast and 
Shrapnel, 1943)47 is a kagaku eiga showing striking similarities to 
The Effects of the Atomic Bomb. Made toward the end of the 
Pacific War when few kagaku eiga were in production, the film 
ostensibly warns viewers of the danger of bomb blast. In reality, 
it is an exhaustive (and exhausting) investigation of the effects 
of different kinds of bombs. Wood panels, paper screens and 
different varieties of domestic animals are arranged in concentric 
circles around bombs of various tonnage. One by one they blast 
away, and then survey the damage in minute detail. Needless to 
say, the explosions are the only interesting part of this investi-
gation. Bakufu to danpen feels in retrospect like a trial run for 
the The Effects of the Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 
continuity between the two films in terms of style and conception 
of documentary is undeniable. 
The difference, of course, is the object - of the bombs and 
the filmmaking. The initial object of the Nichiei film was the 
filmmakers' sense of shock and outrage, which was to be sent to 
the world through the International Red Cross. It was with the 
entry of Monbusho and its investigation that the film's objects 
became something quite different, something far more compli-
cated and difficult to uncover. The filmmakers assumed the per-
spective of their scholarly colleagues. Perhaps they even 
welcomed science as a crutch for comprehending the devastation 
they faced. In any case, we may still see the tension between the 
two attitudes in one of the few extant Japanese documents: 
the shooting log of Miki Shigeru's second camera assistant, Kiku-
chi Shu: 
1. Mr. Chitani. Bombed within the 104th military, 900 metres 
east of the epicenter. Military clothes, right hand bandaged, 
rays hit from behind, 10 days after bombing showed signs of 
atomic bomb sickness. Medium level of hair loss, bleeding 
gums, blood spots, rest and recuperation. White blood count 
after 1 month, 1,400, bums relatively light. (at Hiroshima 
Army Hospital Ujishina Clinic) 
2. Name unknown, 26 year old male. Bombed near 
epicenter at weapons section of Chugoku Military District, 
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burns extend over wide area, hair loss, diarrhea, 40 degree 
fever. -. ~n ~, scene, lies sleeping on side, burns and thinning 
body, pItiful, It s thought survival is difficult. (at Red Cross 
Hospital) 
3. 23 years old, sanitation corps of Main Army Hospital, 
rays ~om be~d while gathering with education group for 
mormng greetings. Lost ear from bums. High level of hair 
loss,. diarrhea, fever, spots. Level two bums, miraculously 
sUfVlved. (at Red Cross Hospital) 
4. Takeuchi Yone (Mother, 31 years old), Takeuchi You 
(Daughter, 13. years old). Yone, purple spots, bleeding gums, 
cough, breathing difficulties. Condition turned serious while 
7.6 ~e fr~g and comp?sition of this image demonstrates the power 
of tJ;1e c~ematic/photographic apparatus in the 'process of turning human 
bo~es .mto rep~esentation - or, more specifically, converting human 
bemgs mto data. (McGovern Collection.) 
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nursing daughter. 2, 3 days after shooting died? Daughter You, 
hair loss, diarrhea, fever. Right elbow separated, outside of 
right knee - lower left thigh has external wounds, showing 
condition of ulcers. (at Oshiba Public School, temporary evacu-
ation place)48 
These notes reveal a tension between the conventional 
demands of the kagaku eiga and the filmmakers working within 
those strictures. In at least one point in these notes, Kikuchi fails 
to suppress his emotional response in the process of turning 
human bodies into representation - or more specifically, as he 
converts human beings into data. This kind of emotional response 
seems perfectly evacuated from the film itself, begging us to 
examine the difference between the media of 'memo' and 
'cinema.' , 
We can approach this problem by rooting the point of view 
out of each document. As the product of an individual, the Kiku-
chi memo presents few difficulties. Like any writer, he thinks of 
his audience and the controversial demands of the genre in which 
he works: in his role as a camera assistant, he records information 
on shots and their location for his directors and editors. For the 
scientists and writers, he includes information on medical aspects. 
However, as the producer of this writing, he is also capable of 
injecting a more personal response that sums up his feelings: 
'pitiful.' 
With a staff of over 30, not including the scientists, supervisors 
and bureaucrats, the point of view of the film is far more compli-
cated, far less obvious. A useful tool is the term 'documentary 
voice' proposed by Bill Nichols. 49 We can think of a documen-
tary's voice as the site of enunciation from which the film is 
produced, the place from which it speaks. The Effects of the 
Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki offers the viewer an 
explicit point of view in its introductory sequence. It begins with 
a short narrative of the attack, followed by a bird's eye view of 
Japan via maps, gradually zeroing in on Hiroshima. Once on the 
ground images of rubble 'which testify more eloquently than 
anything else to the enormous destructive power of the new 
bomb,' accompany narration that locates us: beginning with 
images from 15 kilometres away from the epicenter, the film 
moves the spectator steadily in a single direction to 10 kilometers, 
8, 5, 4, 2, then, 1,500 metres, 1,000, 800, 300 ... and as the film 
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escorts us to the zero point, a truck loaded with filmmakers and 
scientists converges on this very same spot. They all jump out of 
the truck, and with much pointing of fingers and scientific instru-
ments and still cameras, their investigation - and the kagaku eiga 
begins. 
This is a classic arrival scene in the tradition of anthropology, 
a trope that taps deeply into the 'first contact' metaphor. It is a 
new world of strange and awesome powers that they enter. Even 
'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' plays in the background, indicating a 
novel kind of will to power with an unintentional irony Nietzsche 
would not have appreciated. Having staged an explicit point of 
view for the film in introducing these scientists, the filmmakers 
constantly reinforce it with scenes of the scientific teams walking 
through the rubbl~, making measurements, picking flowers, peer-
ing into microscopes, gathering up bones, treating horrific injuries, 
and conducting autopsies in dark, makeshift sheds. The narrator 
stands in for the scientists, speaking for them in the strange, 
unnervingly technical language of specialists. In terms of author-
ship the Monbusho scientists are placed in positions of textual 
authority; in addition to their on-screen presence, their names and 
institutions are included on the titles introducing every section. 
Although the film offers them as the point of view governing the 
filmic investigation, we must remember that the documentary 
voice is usually hidden by the work of the film. Behind the nar-
rator, behind the scientists, the enunciation of The Effects of the 
Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki comes from a far 
different place. 
The atomic bombings obliterated the meaning held by both 
cities' topography; all the landmarks, grids of road, natural ter-
rain, and buildings were instantly rendered insignificant, even if 
they survived the blast. Suddenly, the city maps came to rely on 
an imaginary point: the Epicenter. The Hypocenter. Ground Zero. 
Anything straying from the sphere of this powerful point became 
meaningless and unseen. Even though the cities have long been 
rebuilt and their citizens live by new maps, outsiders still cling 
to the Epicenter. All creators of representations of the atomic 
bombings, no matter their physical or temporal location, inevi-
tably feel the demanding pull of this point, this originary space 
in the air. The cannisters of steel known as 'Little Boy' and 'Fat 
Man' may have vaporized in their own self-annihilation, but they 
still demand the privilege of ultimate reference point, leaving 
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only that powerful magnetic, imaginary point we call the Epic-
enter. The necessity of resisting this demand raises the potential 
impossibility of adequately representing the horror of the atomic 
bombings. Writers, musicians, and filmmakers alike have worked 
to resist the call of the Epicenter for half a century, insisting 
on different meanings while struggling to overcome the seeming 
impossibility of any such attempt. The reason that The Effects of 
the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the single most 
important film about the atomic bombing the reason why its 
appropriations ultimately 'fail' while being better films - the 
reason we must force ourselves to watch the original - is that it 
remains the only film that expresses no need to give human 
meaning to the bombing. This is to say, the film gives voice to the 
point of view of the bomb itself. Nothing is more terrifying. 
'There is no attempt in [this film1 to "think from within the 
wounds" and to apply the lessons of human suffering, even if 
there are many images of actual wounds,' wrote Tsurumi Shun-
suke, referring to the Americans he assumed were responsible 
for the film's inhuman attitude.so In fact, this perfectly describes 
the point of view of the bomb which inflicted the wounds in the 
first place. If one attempts to 'think from the place that inflicts 
wounds,' the difficulty of adequately portraying extreme horror 
vanishes. The problematic of the impossibility of representation 
did not exist for the Nichiei filmmakers because they obeyed the 
call of the bomb. Working within the conventions of the kagaku 
eiga, they portrayed the cataclysmic events in Nagasaki and Hiro-
shima with the logic of the Epicenter. From this departure point 
(of view) there is nothing particularly challenging about describ-
ing the interaction of molecules and their effect on rock, wood, 
and living tissue. • 
This returns us to the differences between the media of 'memo' 
and 'film,' the most crucial of which are the respective techno-
logies of representation. It must be acknowledged that, unlike 
the memo's 'pencil and paper,' the cinematic apparatus consisting 
of 'mechanism and light' is deeply linked to the point of view we 
confront at the Epicenter. Devices like Marey's camera gun and 
the 'camera guns' invented to shoot WWII air battles from the 
point of view of aircraft machine guns reveal this connection in 
the very roots of cinema.S1 Furthermore, artists of all political 
persuasions have been fond of comparing cinema to weaponry 
ever since the silent era. However, these are only surface 
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7.7 'frees that resisted the downward blast point to the imaginary point 
of the Epicenter. (McGovern Collection.) 
examples that point us somewhere deeper, more fundamental. 
Referring to The Effects of the Atomic Bomb, Nibuya Takashi 
notes, 'In this film, which was earnestly made as a medical report, 
the absolute indifference of camera/film is violently exposed, nul-
lifying the good will or passions of the photographers.'52 When 
the Nichiei filmmakers submitted to the demands of the Epic-
enter, their technology of representation found its perfect match 
in the bomb. The film they produced represents a meeting of 
subject and object escaping the consciousness of its human pro-
ducers. Documentary theory has dealt exclusively with the mean-
ing humans invest in sounds and images of reality. This focus 
frequently has blinded us to the absolute indifference of the 
sounds and images themselves. The complicated apparatus that 
captures, preserves, and reproduces light is fundamentally 
inhuman, like the bomb itself. Only in the brief vacuum of mean-
ing when all human maps were obliterated by the extreme vio-
lence of the atomic explOSions could a film like this be made. 
At the same time, this does not foreclose the possibility of 
resistance to the epicenter's insistent tug. If we attend to the film 
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more closely, peer into the spaces between the frames and reach 
behind its words, we may find an impressive will to resist. I 
have emphasized Nichiei's complicity with the Epicenter, a~ it 
perfected the codes of the kagaku eiga that en~ble~ the meetmg 
of apparatus and atomic bomb. !fowever, thIS clfc~e. was, not 
complete. Most viewers of the origmal film note a deCISIve differ-
ence between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki sections which cleaves 
their experience of the film in two. The N~gasaki. half se?ms 
vaguely more humane. Kogawa Tetsuo descnbes this sensatIon: 
'When I saw the Nagasaki part, especially the images of the 
Urakami church and the statue of the Christ, I couldn't help 
thinking that the influence of the Americans had been particularly 
strong. It seems that the filmmakers expressed a feeling of anger 
and indignation in these images. This is certainly becau~e of 
Nagasaki's relationship to Christianity. I felt that Nagasaki had 
been looked at through Western eyes.'53 
More likely, it was seen through the eyes of a native of Naga-
saki, Ito Sueo. 
Each segment of the atomic bomb film was accomplished 
through the teamwork of scientists and cameramen. They s~ot 
the footage together, and the images were assembled according 
to scenarios penned by the scientists. As the senior director, Ito 
was placed in charge of postproduction, and put extra effort into 
the Nagasaki section. Ito had grown up in Nagasaki, and was 
outraged at what had happened to his home.54 As we saw above, 
Ito worked by his 'own plan' on location ... in what was left of 
his home town. The other filmmakers assumed the perspective 
of the Epicenter, translating it faithfully to the screen and reserv-
ing any misgivings they might have felt for other m:dia, such as 
memos, diaries, and face-to-face human conversatIOn. On the 
other hand, Ito built his anger into the fabric of the Nagasaki 
section to which he devoted special attention. He - and certainly 
others ~t Nichiei - treated the point of view of the bomb like a 
masquerade. napped by the powers of both Monbusho and the 
American occupation military, they worked within the limits of 
the kagaku eiga while subverting its conventions from the insi~e. 
The Nagasaki half, like the Hiroshima section preceding It, 
opens with a brief sketch of the city before its annihilation. It 
emphasizes the city's historical importance as a gateway between 
Japan and the outside world, showing a travelogue of prebomb 
views of Urakami Cathedral and environs, and pointing out, per-
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haps with a touch of irony: 'Surrounded by house-covered hills, 
Nagasaki is, or rather used to be, one of the most picturesque 
port cities of Japan.' As in Hiroshima, the bomb obliterates all 
this, replacing it with the epicenter as all-powerful reference 
point. 
The Nagasaki section relies on the spherical guidelines sur-
rounding the epicenter, but reveals things there which the 
filmmakers of the Hiroshima section left out as irrelevant. The 
plants examined in Nagasaki are in the newly planted garden of 
a man who, according to the narration, lost his house, his wife 
and his daughter, but who refused to leave his home. The scien-
tists find the garden useful data for their investigation of radioac-
tivity on seeds and plant life; the filmmakers use the garden to 
add a touch of melodrama that momentarily undermines the 
scientific tone of the kagaku eiga. 
There are no moments like this in Hiroshima, where 'things' 
are treated only as 'data.' Without the slightest irony, the Hiro-
shima section on Blast notes in passing that one of the sturdier 
buildings at the epicenter was a hospital. However, the damage 
the structure sustained is more important than its preblast func-
tion. The latter is irrelevant to the logic of the bomb. The compar-
able sequence in the Nagasaki section is quite different. While 
careful to follow the rule of listing the radius of each building 
from the epicenter, the narrator never fails to record how many 
human beings were killed in each structure in Nagasaki. More-
over, the buildings were clearly chosen with care: schools, prisons, 
hospitals and, with a legible tone of irony, the factory that pro-
duced the bombs dropped on Pearl Harbor. 
The Nagasaki sequence on Heat also carefully selects objects 
charged with meaning. It opens with a longshot of Urakami 
Cathedral, gradually drawing nearer and nearer, and ending with 
the closeup of a statue scarred by the bomb's heat. Dark bums on 
its stone face look like tears. This structural movement between 
distance and closeness, between indifference and the potential for 
emotion, is repeated throughout the Nagasaki half of the film. 
Nowhere is this more strongly evident than in the Medical 
Section, where an accumulation of destruction and violence over- . 
comes the film's own cold scientific framework. Earlier, the effects 
of the atomic bomb on human bodies were introduced in Hiro-
shima in brutally clinical terms. The Hiroshima section is long, 
complicated, and with its frigid medical terminology the narration 
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7.8 The remains of Urakami Cathedral, Nagasaki. (McGovern 
Collection.) 
is incomprehensible to the lay person. Human bodies are put on 
display; victims pose before the camera, exposing their wounds. 
The Hiroshima human effects section climaxes with autopsies and 
photomicroscopy of human tissue. In stark contrast, the Nagasaki 
section begins with music in minor mode and the jarring scene 
of two victims lying together - a mother and child. The music 
gives way to silence and the images reveal one victim after 
another. This time, the narration avoids scientific jargon and 
simply describes the wounds suffered by each person in the 
attack. Most of the victims are young girls. The music returns 
near the end with the images of two extremely sick sisters, and 
a little boy whose mouth was burned into a gaping hole. This 
gradual climax of horrifying violence ends quietly with the image 
of a youth - with little hair left - surveying open fields of rubble 
out the hospital window. Viewers may be numbed by this point 
over two hours into the film, however, the design of this sequence, 
which avoids scientific investigation to emphasize human pain, 
infuses the Nagasaki section with something less than indiffer-
ence. This is to say, The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima 
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and Nagasaki never achieves a perfect representation of the point 
of view of the Epicenter. 
However, few films or videos have come closer to embodying 
the absolute indifference of the camera, and this is what makes 
it so powerfully, disturbingly, attractive to other filmmakers. For 
while it is difficult to admit, there are dangerous pleasures to be 
had here.55 
The work of subsequent filmmakers, despite their honest inten-
tions of resistance, is driven by the will to appropriate this veiled 
power and its charms. In this sense, we may think of the exploita-
tion of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Naga-
saki for 'found footage' as cannibalization. Ito and his colleagues, 
to the limited extent they were able, subverted the point of view 
of the bomb; subsequent filmmakers cannibalized their images. 
As an icon of imagined terror, cannibalism taps into a repulsion 
appropriate to our discussion at hand: a fear of one's own death 
and victimization. Historically, cannibalism has been deployed as 
a hideous accusation that turns others into 'barbarians' but to 
understand how postwar filmmakers have made use of the atomic 
bomb film, I wish to approach it from another perspective. In 
ritualistic practice, the cannibal devours human bodies to incor-
porate the other's magic. Appropriately enough, cannibalism has 
even occurred as part of ritualistic drama. It is a means to obtain 
certain qualities of the consumed, an appropriation absorbing the 
vitalities of other bodies. The cannibal reduces their power while 
making it one's own. As a trope for adaptation and appropriation, 
both stereotype and practice powerfully converge. 
Even before Nichiei finished its film, the cannibalization began. 
As the Nichiei filmmakers collected their images in Hiroshima, 
the Tokyo office used their rushes in a newsreel released on 
September 22, 1945.56 However, the next public cannibalization 
of its images exposes a viewership that has succumbed to the 
charms of the Epicenter. This was in the summer of 1946, when 
the U.S. government released the most horrific scenes of human 
victims to Paramount for its Paramount News reports of the 
Bikini experiments. A short newspaper article in the New York 
Tunes describes the film in a matter-of-fact tone which reveals a 
mixture of dread and fascination: 'Most of the victims look as 
though they had been scarred by an acetylene torch.'57 We find a 
better clue to people's reaction in the advertisements surrounding 
the article. It seems Paramount did not know how to handle the 
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images for the ads graphically emphasize the Bikini Explosion, 
including the Nichiei footage while not calling attention to it: 
Most Spectacular Pictures Ever Filmed 
First Underwater Bomb Makes Cataclysmic 
Upheaval 
Captured Jap FIlms Show After Effect of Atomic Blasted Hiroshima 
This reserve did not last long. The powerful charms expressed 
in the meeting of Epicenter and apparatus immediately won view-
ers, and the next days' advertisements responded in kind, switch-
ing Bikini to second billing and graphically appealing to the 
desires of potential spectators with larger, bolder print and spec-
tacular word choice: 
Films Show Terrible Suffering of Maimed, 
Burned Victims 
This fascination with the absolute indifference of the Epicenter 
and its violence was possible in the wake of the bomb, but since 
then the atomic bombings have slowly become imbricated deeper 
and deeper into networks of human discourse, gradually moving 
out of the realm of the epicenter. The 'original' film becomes 
inseparable from and experienced through written histories, 
memoirs, and the fabric of other films. The point of view of the 
bomb has become veiled, and thus its potential power has 
increased dramatically. 
After the silence of the occupation, filmmakers as diverse as 
Alain Resnais (Hiroshima Mon Amour, 1959) and Kamei Fumio 
(It's Good to Be Alive, [kite ite yokatta, 1956) began cannibalizing 
the silent print saved by the Nichiei conspirators. The print 
returned to the Japanese government in 1967 remains suppressed 
in the hands of Monbusho and the Nishina Institute.58 However, 
this is only a copy of the McGovern print from the U.S. National 
Archives, which has an unusually open policy allowing anyone 
from anywhere to copy films in the public domain. Once this film 
was deposited at the National Archives for all humanity, and 
protected by this institution which values access, film and video 
artists from around the world started to cannibalize its images, 
beginning with Paul Ronder and Erik Bamouw's eloquent and 
understated Hiroshima, Nagasaki 1945 (1968). 
While nearly all fictional filmmakers dare only to approach the 
representation of the atomic attacks in the most indirect terms -
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through metaphor or science fiction - documentarists cour-
ageously cut straight to the Epicenter, cannibalizing documentary 
images of human bodies that express the terrifying banality of 
the bomb. Despite this process of constant reappropriation and 
repetition, the images continue to tap into the absolute indiffer-
ence of the Epicenter. Thus, they possess a powerful attraction 
for documentary filmmakers and viewers alike. Unlike their col-
leagues in fictional filmmaking, documentarists tum the impossi-
bility of representation to their own advantage. By removing and 
consuming pieces of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb, document-
arists incorporate its terrible power. They tear away the veil and 
offer a glimpse of the cruel, matter-of-fact violence of the bomb. 
Through the power they have made their own, they unleash the 
energy contained in these images only to divert it toward new 
kinds of resistance. 
Through these precious efforts, filmmakers around the world 
have converted The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki into an archive of memory. As Kogawa suggests, 
our atomic bomb film has gone far beyond the categories of 'film,' 
'video' or 'television.' Its images have been peeled from their 
tissue of emulsion and turned into a virtual body of atomic images 
available for cannibalization. The actual celluloid exposed by 
Nichiei in the remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains 
maboroshi, but its images are now scattered over the Earth in 
every media possible, including our consciousness. I would like 
to think that despite the continuing production of nuclear wea-
ponry by people living the logic of the Epicenter, one reason the 
fruits of their labor have not been used in attacks on human 
beings is that filmmakers have deposited the terrifying, indifferent 
images of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki into the consciousness of each and every one of us. 
This reworking of experience and replenishment of memory 
becomes all the more important as the real suffering of the 
hibakusha recedes into history. For this reason, the one appropri-
ation of this film which escapes the magical logic of cannibaliz-
ation is probably the most important one as well. In an act of 
real resistance that in some way continued and completed the 
defiance of the four Nichiei filmmakers before them, Japanese 
citizens began a movement to circumvent Toho's dubious legal 
claim to the film and its further suppression by the power of 
Monbusho. In the 1980s, they repatriated The Effects of the 
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Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and all the color 
footage shot by the USSBS by collecting donati~ns and pu~cha~~ 
ing everything foot by foot from the U.S. NatlOnal ~chives. 
After buying the Nichiei film, they even arranged for Its uncut 
television broadcast through regional stations.60 In the process of 
repatriating the original material, they made their ~wn films and 
published books which resist the charms of the epicenter not by 
cannibalizing its power, but by redirecting us to a space all but 
forgotten (or simply avoided): the point of view of the vic~im. 
Substituting the point of view of hibakusha for the Eplcen~er 
as the all-powerful reference point, they searched out the SUfVlV-
ing people captured by Nichiei and USSBS cameras. They as~ed 
directly for permission to show the hibakusha's images publicl~. 
Their films, books and screenings were centered on the expen-
7.9 (McGovern Collection.) 
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ences of the people who had been photographed. The images 
they appropriated - the callous mug-shots of The Effects of the 
Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - were placed along-
side contemporary movies and snapshots of the victims testifying 
about their experience ... as well as images of them smiling and 
playing with their children. This opposition of representations 
expresses the tragedy of hibakusha without losing sight of their 
humanity. Despite its complex history of suppressions and all the 
competing intentions to which it has been subjected, this archive 
of memory has survived to bring us to this point. This, finally, is 
the origin of hibakusha cinema: 
Taniguchi Sumiteru: 'Even at the period of shooting, which 
was five months after the bombing, bloody pus flowed from 
both sides of my body every day. It was terrible. Before 
photographing my deep red back, the nurses wiped it clean. 
Before shooting, yo. Even though it was winter, maggots 
emerged daily, and picking them out was awful. The lights 
during shooting were hot, and any number of times I thought 
I'd faint, YO.'61 
Shibasaki Tokihiko: 'They did this to my body. And they 
even took pictures!'62 
Notes 
1 I would like to thank Daniel McGovern, Erik: Bamouw, Bill Murphy 
and Fukushima Yukio for their help in assembling research materials 
for this article. 
2 Kogawa, 167. 
3 According to the title of one biography, Miki Shigeru is the 'Man 
Who Shot the Maboroshi Atomic Bomb FUm.' The jacket wrap of 
Harry Mimura's biography cries, 'I'm the one who shot the maboro-
shi atomic bomb film!!' See Uno and Kudo. 
4 Uriu (1981) describes some of the discussions preceeding their meet-
ing with Ito, pp.2-11. He also offers some information about the 
other cameramen who shot footage in Hiroshima just after the 
attacks. In English, see Hirano (1993), as well as Hirano's essay in 
this volume. 
5 Inoue, 68. 
6 Inoue, 69-70. 
7 Kano (1968), 72. 
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8 Interviewed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu (Confiscated Atomic 
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9 This is a reference to a famous scene from Kamel FumlO s F~ghtlng 
Soldiers (Tatakau heitai, 1938), which Miki photograp~ed. ?JUs l?ng 
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Its pitiful death represented the suffering of both sldes dormg the 
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suppressed and Kamei was arrested. 
10 Uno, 39-41. 
11 Barnouw (1982), 342. 
12 Inoue, 70-75. 
13 Interviewed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu. 
14 Inoue, 74. 
15 Liebow, 194. 
16 Interviewed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu. 
17 Memorandum photographed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu. The 
original is in possession of Liebow's spouce. 
18 Schwichtenberg, Albert H. memo to G-2 GHQ AFPAC, APO .500, 
Advance (28 December 1945), [Daniel A. McGovern CollectlOn]. 
Furthermore, that the doctors already posses~ed rus~es of the medi-
cal aspects footage suggests there were ultenor. moti~es. 
19 Daniel A. McGovern. 'Subject: Japanese Motion Plcture Fllm of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki,' memo to Lt. Com: Woodward (29 
December 1945): 2 [Daniel A. McGovern CollectlOn]. . 
20 Buck, Walter A. memo to Headquarters, United States Strategtc 
Bombing Survey, APO 181 [atten. L~. Col. Woodward], (3 January 
1946), [Daniel A. McGovern Collecuon]. . . 
21 Castles, William I. 'Subject: Documentary AtOIDlC Bombmg Fllm 
[attn. Mr. Akira Iwasaki, Manager], memo to Nichiei (11 January 
1946) [Daniel A. McGovern Collection]. 
22 Wbil~ this essay concentrates primarily on ~tten documents,. ~ere 
I also refer to verbal discourses such as gOSSIp and oral trad1t~ons 
of film lore. As for written texts, a cursory 100k a: the vanous 
discussions contained in the bibliography below will qUlckly u~cover 
differences. Oral discourses this writer has been party to m the 
1990s are even more contradictory and oriented to~ard spectacle. 
23 This doesn't rule out other possibilities: Iwasaki mlSunderstoo~ th; 
somewhat vague wording of the English-language memo, or didn t 
tell the others until the eleventh hour .. '. . 
24 aearly troubled by the storie~ of force~, o~ Vlolent, confiscation, 
McGovern now emphasizes this perspeCtive m ~e .s~onge~t terms, 
pointing to the purchase order that engaged N1chie s semce. The 
'Receipt for Supply or Service' amounts to US$20,158.66, a~d 
includes lines for hotel charges in Nagasaki for the film crew, tram 
fare, raw film stock, sound recor~g, title p~oduction, .~sert and 
map design, music selection, translation, narration, la?, ed1tmg, over-
time transportation equipment rental, and 604 still photographs (Pro~urement Number SC-8T-PD 200-46, dated 30 March 1946). 
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This budget was ~eriv~d b~ a memo signed by lawasaki coming to 
¥314,399 (Iwasaki Aklra. Statement of the Production Cost on 
'Effects of the Atomic Bomb: undated). [both documents in Daniel 
A. McGovern Collection1. 
25 'Film of atomic bombings discovered hidden away' 3. 
26 Tanikawa Yosltio, 220. ' 
27 Ito, 86. 
28 Ufion, 455. 
29 Imahori, refered to in Lifton. 
30 Interviews and correspondence with the author. 
31 Ga~, 8. The story was also distributed by International News 
ServIce under the headline 'Atomic Bomb Film Epic Enroute to 
U:S.' . but much of thi~ report was incorrect. There is a newspaper 
chppmg from the servIce, with no bibliographic information in the 
McGovern Collection. ' 
32 Me: the classification of the Nicltiei film, McGovern and Dyer 
continued to pursue the possibility of creating films from the colour 
footage they shot with Mimura and Susson. In addition to five 
training films, the project included a feature length documentary to 
be ~roduced by Warner Brothers for a wide public release. The 
studio offer~ to make the documentary 'for indoctrination pur-
,,?oses, showmg the .effects on the economic, cultural, and political 
life of Japan resulting from strategic air attack by the Army Air For~.s' (Anderson, Orvil. 'Subject: Preparation of Documentary and 
Trammg Ftlms for. the Army Air Forces,' memo to Commanding 
General, Amty Air Forces [10 July 1946]). The Warners project 
eventually fell through, however, the footage was momentarily 
downgraded from 'Secret' to 'Confidential' long enough for McGov-
ern ~o co~p]et~ five training films: The Effect of the Atomic Bomb Ag~tnst H,ros~tma, The Effect of the Atomic Bomb Against Naga-
sa,,!> TJ:e Medzeal Aspects of the Atomic Bomb, The Effect of Stra-
tegzc Au Attack 19ainst Japan, and The Effect of the Aerial Mining 
Pro.granda (AuStin, Gordon H. 'SUbject: Qassification of US. Stra-
tegic Bombing Survey Training Ftlm Project: memo to Commanding 
General, Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama [12 April 1947]). 
These memoranda are in the McGovern Collection. 
33 This mat~rial emerged .from its suppression with the closing of ~o~n. Air Force Base 10 1994. As of tltis writing, it seems to be 
sItting m boxes at the National Archives. See note 35 for details. 
34 A sh0r:t .ltistory of the Nicltiei print: Throughout the occupation the 
US. military enforced a representational silence Over the subject of 
the atomic bombings. The reels hidden by the four Nichiei filmmak-
ers - 7 to 13 depending on which account you read _ remained in 
Mik.i Shigeru's lab until the end of the occupation in 1952. Iwasaki, 
Kano and Ito went to retrieve the film only to tind that Toho had 
beat them to it. After reorganization, Nichiei came under the ~mb~ella of Toho and the studio made its claim for the film. Con-
sldenng the support the production received from Monbusho and 
the USSBS, their claim to the rights is dubious. However, they keep 
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a firm grip on the film to this day. 
In the 19505 and 19605, Toho limited its use to a handful of films, 
angering many who suspected both political motives and the f~ru: of 
affecting their foreign markets. The first postwar appropnatlOn 
of the film was an special issue of Asahi News (#363) released on 
the anniversary of the end of the war.in 1953: Enti~ed Genb~ku 
gisei dai ichigo (The First At0':lic Bombmg Sacrifice), It called Hiro: 
shima a 'city of death' in whIch 'no trees or gras~ can ~e foun~: 
The newsreel was shown to Japanese American audlences m Hawall, 
where it came to the attention of the US. government. The Us. 
embassy asked Nicltieishlnsha for an explanation, but there was 
nothing they could do as the occupation was over. The incident 
apparently ended when the Japanese company offered the US .. a 
print (yet another copy that h.as .d~sat:peared). The response to thlS 
newsreel was so strong that Nlchlelshinsha made a 2-r:el do?umen-
tary, Genbaku no Nagasaki (Atomic Bombed Nagasak,), which was 
shown in Toho theaters (Uno, 43). . .. 
After this a number of other films drew images from the Nlchiel 
print: Eien no heiwa 0 (For Eternal Peace), Senso no kao (The Face 
of War), and the Swedish films Waga toso (0u.r Struggle), Zoku 
waga toso (Our Struggle Continued) .. The ~?st ~p?rtant films t? 
make use of the material were Kamel FUmlo s lkite Ue yokatta (It s 
Good to Be Alive) and Alain Resnais' Hiroshima Mon ~mour. 
Consciousness of the film grew, even among the general public, and 
calls to repatriate the film grew in hand. The !apanese government 
repeatedly asked the Us. for the film, and theu request was repeat-
edly turned down. When the McGovern print surfaced in 1967 (see 
note 35), the incomplete, silent Nichiei print was. no longer ~s pre-
cious as before. However, Toho continues to claw. a leg~ nght ~o 
the film, even though the Us. g~)Vernment considers It public domam 
and makes the film freely available for purchase through the US. 
National Archives. Even so, when Fukushima Yukio and I screened 
the complete film at the 1991 Yamagata International Doc~ment~ry 
Fum Festival, we had to clear permission with Toho despIte ~smg 
the Peace Museum's print (which they purchased ~om the NatIOnal 
Archives). Luckily, film and video makers outsld~ of JaI?an are 
unaware of this problem and consider the film public do~a~. 
35 A short history of the McGovern print: After the classlficatlOn of 
the film McGovern took all the black and white and color footage 
to Wnght Field in Ohio. There he catalogued everything, and made 
four or five training films from the color footag~. !=Ie stru~~ the 
16mm copy just before moving on to other work Wlthin the milltary. 
Although this could have brought him trouble, he felt it nec~sary 
to ensure that future generations would have the film even if ~e 
original materials disappeared (this is USAF 17679). The acc:esslon 
date for tltis hidden print is unclear. There are records 10 the 
National Archives that suggest it was declassified in the 1950s, but 
a BBC report claimed the print was moved in 1960 (Kudo, 209). 
In any case, the US. government refused to release the film for 
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political reasons. The Miami Herald cited unnamed sources to report 
that the U.s. wouldn't ~elease the film for fear of damaging Us.· 
Japan relations (The Mwni Herald [18 May 1967]: ll-A). It even 
publishe~ an edit?rial calling for the release of the film to inject 
so~e senOusness mto the arms talks in the midst of a Middle East 
cnsis. (The Miami Herald [25 May 1967]). Throughout the 1950s 
and 196Os, Herbert Susson, one of the American supervisors working 
unde~ .Mc<!overn: pushed hard for the film's release. As a network 
teleVlSlon Journalist, he had powerful connections (from Munow to 
Truman). However, none of them could (or desired to) do anything. 
Susson ~ad ~ contacted McGovern for help, but McGovern was 
bus~ ~th his ~wn. car~r within the military, perhaps afraid of 
re~bution consldenng his position. (Susson's unflagging and Crus-
trati?g e~orts to have the film released from its suppression are 
detailed I? Jaffe, 1983.) I~ any case, a 16mm reduction print, and a 
35mn: prmt and magnettc sound track, ended up in the National 
Archives. However, like most of their holdings, nothing 'exists' until 
someone asks for it. 
!he film emerged from its suppression in 1967, when a 16mm 
p~t v.:as ~eturned to Monbusho by the American government. At 
this pOint, It was a matter between governments. Monbusho initially 
set ~p screenings for the filmmakers (see Kano, 74) and various 
offiClals, but they censored the film. In addition to changing the 
name, they censored their own credit and cut all scenes of human 
effects. The latter was done in deference to the victims - at least 
that is ~hat they claimed - but they did not reinsert the footage 
when hibakusha themselves made an issue of it. Monbusho allowed 
the ~nsored version to be shown on NHK Education channel on 
Ap~ 20, 1968. The censorship was roundly criticized by writers and 
SUVlVors, some on the strongest terms; Hayama: 'Even twenty-three 
years after the war, parties affiliated with Monbusho and the 
Japanese government add to the criminal deed of the American 
government and those concerned with it who stole and kept the film, 
making it a double robbery.' (Hayama, 122) Furthermore Monbusho 
severely limited access to the film, stating. 'in order t~ avoid the 
film being utilized for political purposes, applications for loan of 
the film from labor unions and political organizations will be turned 
d~wn.'. As~hi Evening News quoted in Bamouw, 1982, 92). Today, 
this pnnt IS ~eld by the Nishina Institute; together they conspire to 
keep the pnnt from public view by restricting its use to 'scientific 
researchers.' When the Yamagata International Documentary Film 
Festival asked to see it in 1991, our request was summarily denied. 
When documentary film scholar Erik Bamouw heard of the 
controversy ~ Japan over Monbusho's censorship, he decided to 
search for this maboroshi film. Expecting trouble, he went straight 
to the top and wrote Secretary of State Clark Clifford (letter dated 
8 March 1968). He ~eceived an immediate reply from Deputy Assist-
ant ~ecretary Damel Henkin with a surprising response: the film 
was m the National Archives and available to anyone that asked 
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(letter dated 19 March 1968; Barnouw has left a file of this corre-
spondence and other related materials at MOMA, the US. Library 
of Congress, the Imperial War Museum, London, and the Bamouw 
Papers, Special Collections, Columbia University Library). Bar-
nouw bought the print and, with documentarist Paul Ronder, made 
Hiroshima-Nagasak~ August 1945, perhaps the finest documentary 
to use the Nichiei footage. Bamouw (1982, 1988) has described the 
enormous impact of this film in Japan, for it concentrated on 
the images that Monbusho had censored. 
As for the original, classified materials, they were assigned control 
number USN MN 9151 and shipped to the military's archive at 
Norton Air Force Base. With the post-Cold War cuts in the defense 
budget, Norton was closed and in the process of moving the archives 
to March Air Force Base many film prints were transferred to the 
National Archives in 1994. Among these wooden boxes sitting in 
Washington is USN MN 9151. According to shipping records, this 
control number includes a 16mm reduction print and a 35mm dupe 
neg with magnetic soundtrack (I would like to thank Bill Murphy 
of the National Archives for sifting through the shipping records 
for this information). As of this writing, boxes are simply waiting 
to be opened and catalogued. Which print is the earliest generation 
will not be determined until the codes on the film stock are inves-
tigated. 
36 Kogawa, 167. 
37 Kogawa, 174. 
38 Noda, 23. 
39 '''Maboroshi'' no eiga fukugen, joei e,' 4. 
40 Kudo, 15. 
41 Tanikawa, 221. 
42 See, for example, Uno, 42-43. 
43 Conversations and interviews with both filmmakers by Fukushima 
Yukio and myself, as we arranged a screening of the film for the 
Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival in 1991. 
44 Fukushima (1991), 175. 
45 This film also ran into severe difficulties and was finally suppressed. 
Hirano Kyoko has written an excellent history of this production, 
122-145. 
46 Noda, 20-24. 
47 This film is preserved at the Fllm Center of Japan. 
48 Nagai, 39. 
49 See Nichols (1983) and Nichols (1991), 128-133. 
50 Kogawa & Tsurumi, 172-173. 
51 See Vlrilio, Ueno, and Nornes. 
52 Nibuya, 128. 
53 Kogawa, 171. 
54 This information comes from interviews and conversations between 
Ito and Fukushima Yukio when we researched the film's history for 
the Yamagata Fllm Festival. 
55 All screen violence draws on this quality of the apparatus, but 
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s~rouds it in disc~Irsive conventions, routing viewers to the occas-
~lOnal, uncanny glimpse of this stunning indifference. While disturb-
1O~, we a~so confront the charms of the epicenter here. The 
enjoyable Irony of Stanley Kubrick's subtitle for Dr. Strangelove _ 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb - works 
because we understand this. Most recently, the point of view of the 
bo~b, which the Nichiei filmmakers allowed to define the terms of 
theIr photography.and editing, has been literalized through video 
cameras mounted 10 the noses of cruise missiles. During the Gulf 
War, as. each bomb. reac~ed the city of Baghdad on its 'surgical' 
attack, It recorded Its amval at the Epicenter with grainy silent 
absolutely indifferent images. The world watched transfixed and U; 
aw~ while. experiencing the point of view of the' bomb. This fasci-
nation qwckly wears off as the images are absorbed into human 
discourse; the voice of the bomb becomes veiled both containing 
and increasing its potential power. ' 
56 Genshibakudan. - Hiroshima no sangai - Nihon News #257 (Atomic 
Bo~b - The DISastrous D~mage of Hiroshima - Nihon News #257). 
This newsreel was the subject of some controversy in 1994 when a 
reporter from Asahi Shinbun found some memos about it in the 
u.s. National Archives ('GHO, genbaku eizo no joeichushi kento _ 
kenetsu e no hanpats~ osore fumon ni,' 33). They describe an 
exchange between DaVId Conde, the occupational official who con-
troled the Japanese film industry, and censor C. B. Reese. This was 
the period in which the censorship system was 'under construction' 
and had yet to be implimented. Conde had apparently seen the 
~ewsreel before he had the power to censor it. When he saw the film 
10 the theater, some sections had been cut and he wondered who 
~as responsible. He also recommended changes and a different 
tItle, however, they ultimately decided against censorship for fear 
of controversy. The newspaper describes the story in the vaguest of 
~erms, and th~ fact that Kyoko Hirano's reading of the same memos 
1Oclu~es nothing about some anonymous censorship suggests the 
Asahl report was somewhat sensationalized (Hirano 59-60). 
57 'Reaction of humans to atom bomb in film,' 18. ' 
58 See note 35 for more information. 
59 They called the movement Genbaku Kiroku Eiga 10 Ftito Undo 
(Atomic Bomb Documentary Hlm 10 Feet Movement). Calculating 
th~t .3,000 yen. could buy 10 of the total 85,000 feet of film, they 
soliCIted donations around Japan and raised 1,800,000,000 yen in the 
first couple of years. With this they bought all of the color and black 
and white film, and made their own genbaku eiga with Hani 
Susumu and other filmmakers. In 1994, they reinvigorated the move-
ment .to make a Ja'pane~e language vers!on of The Effects of the 
AtomlC Bomb on Htroshlma and Nagasakt. The history of the move-
ment is reported in Nagai, 1983. 
60 There were four broadcasts in 1982. 
61 N~g~, 42. Tanig.uchi appears in two shots, the first shOwing a doctor 
p01Ot1Og at vanous parts of his back with a large tweezers, the 
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second his face staring off into space. This with the narration, 'It 
was midsummer when the atomic bomb hit the heart of Hiroshima 
and the people were thinly clad. Many parts of their body were 
exposed. In fact, quite a large number were semi-nude. FIrst-aid 
stations reported that 80 to 90 per cent of the cases handled by 
them immediately after the bombing were bums. Bums resulting 
directly from the atomic bomb were caused on the parts of the body 
which faced the rays. There were no bums on the opposite side.' 
62 Nagai,62. 
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